Introduction

Interpersonal relations do not arise simply because there is an opportunity for exchange between individuals. These relations help constitute the individual and form a backdrop against which exchange can occur. The purpose of this chapter is twofold. One is to give an account of why interpersonal relations might be constitutive in this sense. The other is to illustrate why this is a significant observation.

In the next section I address the first of these and begin to lay the foundations for the second. Adam Smith's argument in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1976/1759) linking the interpersonal to the special pleasure that we gain from mutual sympathy is my starting point. I have chosen Smith in part because, unlike many contemporary economists, he offers a clear psychological account of this matter, which has been revived recently by Sugden (2002 and chapter 3 of this book). Smith is also interesting because he has the sketch of a more general argument that I shall develop, which is important as it brings out why the observation about the constitutive aspect of interpersonal relations might be significant.

The constitutive nature of interpersonal relations might matter in this sense for a variety of reasons. It could affect the explanations or prescriptions of economic theory and in doing this it might also mark a change in one of the key building blocks of that theory: the model of rational agency.