In 1943, for the first time since the beginning of the war, the military initiative seemed to have passed from Germany to Britain and the Soviet Union. In the European theatres of war plans were developed for the major thrust against the enemy. As a result post-war territorial settlements became less matters of testing the Allies' goodwill towards each other and more questions of the post-war European balance of power. Irrespective of plans developed in Washington and London, military realities were increasingly likely to define territorial and political changes. When it appeared that neither British nor American troops were likely to set foot on the Continent, the entry of Soviet troops into Central and South-eastern Europe was likely to be the overriding reality. The negotiating power of all small allied governments would be diminished unless agreements were reached with the liberating armies and their governments.

For the Polish government-in-exile these developments were particularly unpropitious. Since it aimed to return in advance of, or at least at the same time as allied troops reached Poland, in 1943 it faced only a few policy choices and those only confirmed its weakening position. The stark reality of the exile government's position was that it had ended up in the wrong place and had committed all its resources to the wrong ally. It is doubtful whether in 1940, when the key decisions were made, or even subsequently anyone in the politically active Polish circles in exile could have foreseen what would happen.