Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-nr4z6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-06-05T19:23:26.002Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

2 - “Beyond our power without your help”: Britain's Battle of the Atlantic

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 July 2010

Kevin Smith
Affiliation:
Ball State University, Indiana
Get access

Summary

The continuation of the current rate of loss incessantly adds to the even graver shipping problem with which we shall inevitably be faced in 1941 and later.

Ronald Cross, Minister of Shipping, December 1940

… [public] thoughts at present were more directed toward the dangers of invasion than to the dangers of starvation.

Winston Churchill, July 1940

… limitations of shipping must not be allowed to interfere with the urgent military necessity of concentrating such forces as we required in the Middle East.

Winston Churchill, November 1940

Far from offsetting the failure of British shipbuilding, neglect of port and shipping management initially eroded Britain's logistical independence after France's defeat. Prime Minister Winston Churchill bears culpability for his Government's belated recognition that the long-term threat of a shipping shortage demanded immediate attention. Minister of Shipping Ronald Cross did foresee an escalating shipping crisis. But Churchill overlooked the decline in shipping capacity and delayed priority for seaborne communications. He was preoccupied with the Nazi invasion threat after Germany's conquest of France, and correctly surmised that the British people shared that fear. The Royal Navy concentrated on deterring invasion, largely ignoring escort duties until late autumn. Steel was diverted from merchant shipbuilding to naval and tank production. Obsession with invasion thus threatened to postpone retribution for aggression indefinitely and perhaps bring starvation. Insofar as Churchill focused elsewhere in the autumn of 1940, he prematurely sought success in the Middle East.

Type
Chapter
Information
Conflict over Convoys
Anglo-American Logistics Diplomacy in the Second World War
, pp. 28 - 63
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1996

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×