Syria is the most revealing test case for the failure of change in Middle Eastern politics. Had Damascus moved from the radical to the moderate camp, it would have decisively shifted the overall balance, making a breakthrough toward a new and different Middle East. Syria's participation in the Gulf War coalition of 1991, its readiness to negotiate with Israel, its severe economic and social stagnation and strategic vulnerability – all topped off by the coming to power of a new generation of leadership – provoked expectations that it would undergo dramatic change.

Like so many of the Arab regimes' policies during the twentieth century's second half, Syria's strategy was both brilliant and useless. The regime survived, its foreign maneuvers worked well much of the time, and Syrian control over Lebanon was a moneymaker. But what did all of this avail Syria compared to what an emphasis on peace and development might have achieved?

It was a Western idea that desperation at their country's difficult strategic and economic plight would make Hafiz al-Asad – and Saddam, Arafat, and other Arab or Iranian leaders as well – move toward concessions and moderation. But the rulers themselves reasoned in exactly the opposite way: Faced with pressure to change, they usually became more demanding and intransigent.

Often, at least up to a point, this strategy worked, as the West offered more concessions in an attempt to encourage the expected reforms. Yet to the regimes this behavior seemed the result not of generosity or proffered friendship but of Western fear, greed, or their own superior strength and tactics. This perception encouraged continued intransigence in hope of reaping still more benefits.