The material future of East Asia is clear. Japan's GNP is second only to that of the United States. Even though their economic growth, like Japan's, is now slowing, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan have also reached a high level. Others in the region, including China, are growing quickly, and those that are not are set to. Politically, however, in itself and in its implications for the rest of the world, the East Asian future is opaque. Some observers, especially in the United States, foresee a new military power, even a threat. Some, especially in Japan, see something more peaceably ‘civilian’. Some expect a less dramatic change. But no-one doubts that East Asia will be a force, and that the kind of force it will be will be determined largely by Japan.

The arguments

Self-described ‘realists’ see no reason to believe that a future that contains a rich Japan will be different. ‘For a country to choose not to become a great power’, Kenneth Waltz argues, ‘is a structural anomaly. For that reason, the choice is a difficult one to sustain. Sooner or later, the international status of countries has risen in step with their material resources. Countries with great-power economies have become great powers, whether or not reluctantly.’