Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-x5gtn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-30T12:58:38.149Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

9 - Italy in the eighties: towards central bank independence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 December 2009

Michele Fratianni
Affiliation:
Indiana University
Franco Spinelli
Affiliation:
Università degli Studi di Brescia, Italy
Anna J. Schwartz
Affiliation:
National Bureau of Economic Research, Massachusetts
Get access

Summary

We have seen that the leitmotif of Italian monetary history has been fiscal dominance, that is the supremacy of the Executive in monetary policy matters. The genesis of fiscal dominance goes back to 1 May 1866 when legislation was passed that prevented banks of issue from altering the discount rate without prior government authorisation. The same legislation decided that the Banca Nazionale would grant a loan of Lit 250 million to Treasury, with the amount to be credited to a newly opened Treasury current account (conto corrente di Tesoreria). This account eventually evolved into a virtually automatic mechanism through which the Italian government could finance large portions of budget deficits. Fiscal dominance became very acute in the 1970s under the Governorship of Guido Carli (see chapter 8). The appointment of Paolo Baffi in 1975 represented an intellectual turning point in the history of fiscal dominance. But it was up to Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, who succeeded Baffi in 1980, to put into practice many of the ideas cherished by Baffi. Thus, the struggle of BI to acquire monetary policy autonomy is the principal theme of this chapter. The European Monetary System (EMS), which Italy joined under special conditions, and the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 must be seen in the light of this long overdue process of giving the Italian central bank a degree of independence it had never before been granted.

At the time of writing, BI has completed the process of central bank independence, consistent with the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty. Yet, two critical issues need to be resolved.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1997

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×