Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of illustrations
- Acknowledgements
- List of abbreviations
- Notes on style
- Introduction
- 1 Courtly reformation and the revolution of 1688–1689
- 2 The resources for royal propaganda
- 3 The propagation of courtly reformation
- 4 Courtly reformation, the war, and the English nation
- 5 Courtly reformation and the politics of party
- 6 Courtly reformation and country politics
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
- Cambridge Studies in Early Modern British History
6 - Courtly reformation and country politics
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 October 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of illustrations
- Acknowledgements
- List of abbreviations
- Notes on style
- Introduction
- 1 Courtly reformation and the revolution of 1688–1689
- 2 The resources for royal propaganda
- 3 The propagation of courtly reformation
- 4 Courtly reformation, the war, and the English nation
- 5 Courtly reformation and the politics of party
- 6 Courtly reformation and country politics
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
- Cambridge Studies in Early Modern British History
Summary
THE PROBLEM OF COUNTRY POLITICS
The pattern of conflict between court and country in the reign of William III was very similar to that between whigs and tories. In both instances, a short period of consensus during the prince of Orange's invasion rapidly collapsed back into divisions reminiscent of Charles II's time, and caused considerable difficulties for the new king in his dealings with parliament. In both cases, these difficulties were considerably ameliorated by the deployment of courtly reformation. Just as the rhetoric of moral renewal had allowed William to appeal to partisan politicians, it provided a way in which he could make himself attractive to those suspicious of executive power. By developing a sixth reformation strategy – the presentation of the new regime as the scourge of bureaucratic corruption and vice – William's propagandists were able to calm parliamentarians' fears of the court, and to secure enough support in the legislature to make government possible.
In the case of court and country, the brief consensus of 1688 resulted from the almost total estrangement of the political nation from James II's court. In the face of royal policy since 1685, the mistrust of the executive, which had characterised the country position in the 1670s, became very widespread indeed. By his attacks on the church, James had alienated the traditional supporters of the crown, without attracting any other significant sector of the English elite to his cause.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- William III and the Godly Revolution , pp. 191 - 226Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1996