Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-4hhp2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-06-03T01:29:45.448Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

8 - Entry

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 September 2009

Get access

Summary

In the preceding chapters, the numbers and identities of the firms participating in the market are given. In this chapter, attention is turned to changes in the composition of firms selling in a new market, that is, to entry and exit. Obviously, firms enter new markets if they anticipate profits, but that leaves several questions to be answered: Will firms enter an industry whenever the previously established firms are making positive profits? If a firm would have made a profit if it had been previously established, will it necessarily decide to enter? Can established firms pursue policies that deter or prevent the entry of new firms? Are they better off pursuing such policies? Somewhat similar questions can be asked about the exit of firms: Can a firm be driven out of a market? Under what conditions will it be in the interest of the remaining firms to drive a rival firm out?

The study of entry has been done in several ways. Most familiar is what can be called static entry. The approach in static entry is to use a static, or one-period, model in which the number of firms in the market is a variable and examine market equilibrium as a function of the number of firms. Say that n* is the largest number of firms that can be in the market with nonnegative profits and that for any n < n*, all firms have positive profits.

Type
Chapter
Information
Oligopoly Theory , pp. 180 - 206
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1983

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

  • Entry
  • James Friedman
  • Book: Oligopoly Theory
  • Online publication: 17 September 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511571893.009
Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • Entry
  • James Friedman
  • Book: Oligopoly Theory
  • Online publication: 17 September 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511571893.009
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Entry
  • James Friedman
  • Book: Oligopoly Theory
  • Online publication: 17 September 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511571893.009
Available formats
×