Introduction

Today, the majority of airline reservations are made and tickets are sold through computer reservation systems (CRSs). The history of these systems, however, has been one of continuous controversy, involving both regulatory and antitrust proceedings. This paper is drawn from our work in one of those proceedings, the antitrust suit brought by Continental Airlines (and its associated corporate family) against American Airlines and United Airlines. Our work focused on the so-called bias period – before the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) issued its CRS Rules in 1984 (see C.F.R., 1984). The history and issues involved are recounted briefly below.

Computer reservation systems grew out of the internal reservation systems of the airlines. In the mid-1970s, there was discussion of extending the advancing reservation and information technology to travel agencies. This discussion resulted in the formation of an industry committee, a joint development that soon came to naught, however, when United Airlines and American Airlines pulled out of the committee and each announced it would develop its own system. With the withdrawal of the two largest domestic airlines and (and – not coincidentally – the two with the best-developed internal reservations systems), cooperative development effectively stopped.

Deregulation of the airline industry created powerful incentives for United and American to develop their own proprietary systems. As new carriers began operations and established carriers entered new routes, the number of different flights and itineraries that might suit a particular customer's request could become very large.