This book comprises original research in the field of experimental economics and competition policies. All chapters have in common that they address specific competition issues, policy problems and institutions from the point of view of experimental economics. The chapters of the book cover basically all areas of competition policy making: collusive practices, abusive practices, mergers and we also include auctions. The aim of the book is to assess the scope and the specific contribution of laboratory experiments for competition law and policy. Where appropriate, the articles also cover the relevant legal and game-theoretic background.

The chapters have been specifically written for this book and are not available elsewhere. With one exception, all chapters have been presented at a workshop in Hilversum (Netherlands) in 2005. The workshop and this book are an initiative of the Dutch Economics Network for Competition and Regulation (ENCORE).

Competition issues have a long tradition in experimental economics. In one of the first economics experiments, Chamberlin (1948) already addressed questions central to competition policy. (See also Roth, 1993, on early contributions in experimental economics.) Chamberlin found that in his experimental markets (involving the sale of a fictitious good between many sellers and many buyers) negotiated prices failed to converge to the competitive equilibrium as most of the markets had an average price below the equilibrium. He noted “failure, upon reflection of the problem, to find any reason” why markets should converge to the competitive equilibrium.