Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-x5gtn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-16T23:36:46.740Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

13 - Evaluating the extended target zone proposal for the G3

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 December 2009

David Currie
Affiliation:
London Business School
Paul Levine
Affiliation:
University of Leicester
Get access

Summary

In recent years, there has been growing dissatisfaction with the performance of floating exchange rates. The experience of excessive exchange-rate volatility, prolonged misalignments and persistent and large current imbalances has led to renewed interest in issues of international macro-economic policy coordination in general, and of exchange-rate targets or zones in particular. This has been reflected in the burgeoning research literature concerned with issues of policy coordination. It has also been reflected in the growing interest in economic policy coordination amongst policy-makers. The Plaza Agreement of September 1985 saw the first practical step in this direction with agreement on coordinated exchange market intervention. The Tokyo Summit of May 1986 and the Venice Summit of June 1987 approved the concept of using a set of ‘indicators’ as a framework for policy coordination, but failed to articulate how an indicator system would operate in practice. What is required is a set of rules or guidelines for the conduct of macropolicy which are consistent with the objectives of national governments but which avoid the type of policy conflict that can arise if countries pursue independently determined policies.

The best articulated and most prominent proposal for policy coordination is the extended target zone arrangement, put forward by John Williamson. This envisages a set of mutually consistent wide target zones for real exchange rates, pursued primarily by means of monetary policy; with nominal income targets, pursued primarily by fiscal policy, providing a supporting domestic policy. This proposal is analysed in detail in Williamson and Miller (1987).

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1993

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×