Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-ndmmz Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-06-09T16:06:47.155Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

2 - Making emotion primary

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 December 2009

Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski
Affiliation:
University of Oklahoma
Get access

Summary

No emotional apprehension of an object as frightening, irritating, saddening, etc. can arise except against the background of a complete alteration of the world. For an object to appear formidable, indeed, it must be realized as an immediate and magical presence confronting the consciousness.

Jean-Paul Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions

STARTING WITH EXEMPLARS

If a natural kind N is defined by direct reference, it follows that the metaphysical question “What is N?” is not independent of the epistemological question “Can we identify an N?” Direct reference ensures that our semantic community cannot be radically mistaken about the members of the class of N. Water just is the class of stuff like this. Since the semantics guarantees that there is a sense in which we know what N is, it protects against a certain kind of skepticism. We have already seen that this does not mean that we can identify what makes something an N. That is something we have to find out by scientific investigation. But even about that question, we have a safeguard against a form of skepticism. Whatever makes water what it is, it is what makes this kind of stuff what it is, so at least we know what we need to investigate in order to find out the nature of water.

Exemplarist ethical theory protects against a form of moral skepticism for the same reason that direct reference protects against a form of skepticism about natural kinds.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2004

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×