Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-hfldf Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-15T06:11:33.046Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

9 - Conclusion: Political Predictability and Financial Market Behavior

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 December 2009

William Bernhard
Affiliation:
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
David Leblang
Affiliation:
University of Colorado, Boulder
Get access

Summary

The predictability of political outcomes conditions how markets respond to political events. Where democratic political events have less predictable outcomes, market returns are depressed and volatility increases. In contrast, where market actors can easily forecast the political outcome, returns do not exhibit any unusual behavior. Across currency, stock, and, to a lesser degree, bonds, we demonstrated empirical support for this proposition using a variety of techniques in a number of markets (spot, forward, and futures). The predictability of outcomes can help explain the variation of market responses to political events.

Further, prior beliefs about an eventual outcome condition how political developments affect market behavior. Where new information confirms expectations, market actors do not adjust their portfolios. But when news causes market actors to update their beliefs, markets actors do reallocate their portfolios, and overall market behavior changes. By investigating information arrival in separate political events, we find empirical support for this argument as well.

In some sense, these conclusions are not controversial. Indeed, anecdotal evidence from the financial news media confirms these arguments almost everyday: Markets are “cautious” in the run-up to a particular election. The “market” is taking a “wait-and-see attitude” towards the new government. Market actors “widely anticipated the cabinet dissolution” and did not move in response to the “expected announcement.”

Prior academic investigations, however, have been less successful in finding systematic evidence that markets respond to politics in this manner.

Type
Chapter
Information
Democratic Processes and Financial Markets
Pricing Politics
, pp. 225 - 236
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2006

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×