Is ethnic vote stability a peculiar feature of Romanian or East European electoral politics, or do Ethnic Attractors distinguish ethnic voting in new democracies everywhere? This chapter seeks to elucidate the answer through a statistical study of new democracies since 1945 worldwide. I find that ethnic diversity stabilizes initial vote behavior in heterogeneous new democracies everywhere above and beyond that of homogeneous countries. This finding is particularly interesting in the context of social cleavage theories that argue cleavages are associated with vote stability (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Bartolini and Mair, 1990). While previous studies show a general relationship between the existence of a multitude of social cleavages and vote stability, this is the first study to differentiate the effects of ethnic cleavages from other types.

First, I outline the case selection criteria for the national level test and highlight some of the methodological issues surrounding the cross-national comparison of volatility and ethnic diversity. Second, I talk about other variables that might impinge on the relationship between ethnic diversity and vote preferences that are controlled for in the statistical analysis. Third, I discuss at length the data and methodology used. Finally, I present the regression results in support of the claim that ethnic heterogeneity induces stability of voting behavior at the national level in all new party systems.

The universe of cases examined in this chapter consists of new democracies that have held at least two elections.