The case study chapters have provided a wealth of information about the specific conditions in particular countries under which decree authority is present – or in some cases not present – and the degree to which it provides for executive discretion in policy making. In this chapter we test the hypotheses that were originally presented in Chapter 1 against a broader set of data. For expository purposes we present the hypotheses again, as follows:

1. H1: The greater the influence of the executive (or of those who expect to hold executive office) over constitutional design, the greater the CDA.

2. H2: The greater the level of party discipline, the less likely is either CDA or DDA.

3. H3: Both CDA and DDA are more likely in bicameral than in unicameral systems.

4. H4: The greater the urgency of a policy issue, the more likely is DDA on that issue.

5. H5: When the executive has partisan majority support in the legislature, DDA is more likely than when the executive does not.

6. H6: The stronger the executive veto, the less likely is either CDA or DDA.

7. H7: The more difficult it is for legislators to change the constitution, the less likely is CDA.

8. H8: The greater the independence from the executive of the court that adjudicates executive–assembly disputes; the more likely DDA is.

9. H9a: When the executive has partisan majority support in the legislature, DDA is more likely as the informational advantages of the executive relative to the legislature increases.

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