Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-qxdb6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-29T21:20:06.250Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

2 - The Nonobjectivist Critique of Moral Knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 December 2009

By
Alan Thomas
Edited by
Alan Thomas
Alan Thomas
Affiliation:
Senior Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, University of Kent
Get access

Summary

In Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Bernard Williams developed a subtle and intertwined set of arguments against a contemporary view that he called “objectivism.” Williams is on record as having confessed that some of that work is difficult to follow, partly because of his stylistic trait of presenting arguments in compressed and allusive forms. Certainly, the argument against objectivism is presented in a highly abstract way and while it is clear that a serious obstacle has been placed in the path of an objectivist view of the ethical, it is not entirely clear what that obstacle is. The aim of this paper is to contextualize Williams' arguments in order to bring out their main lines, to explain their inter-relations and to assess their overall cogency. I will argue that the only satisfactory way to respond to his profound challenge to an objectivist form of moral cognitivism is to adopt a certain approach to the underlying epistemology of morality, namely, inferential contextualism. For those who do believe that a core of ethical claims is indeed made up of claims to knowledge, contextualism offers the best way of deflecting Williams' criticisms while incorporating insights from his critique that no form of moral cognitivism ought to neglect.

BETWEEN SUBJECTIVISM AND OBJECTIVISM

It is possible to be more precise as to where, and how, Williams' arguments seem puzzling and in places to verge on the paradoxical.

Type
Chapter
Information
Bernard Williams , pp. 47 - 72
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2007

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Altham, J. E. J. (1995). “Reflection and Confidence,” in Altham and Harrison (eds.), pp. 156–169.
Altham, J. E. J. and Harrison, Ross (eds.) (1995). World, Mind and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Berlin, Isaiah (1969). Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Google Scholar
Blackburn, Simon (1984). Spreading the Word (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Google Scholar
Blackburn, Simon (1993). Essays in Quasi-Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Google Scholar
Blackburn, Simon (1999). Ruling Passions (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Google Scholar
Brink, David (1989). Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gibbard, Allan (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Google Scholar
Hare, R. M. (1952). The Language of Morals (Oxford, Clarendon Press).Google Scholar
Heal, Jane (1989). Fact and Meaning (Oxford: Blackwell).Google Scholar
Hooker, Brad, ed. (1996). Truth in Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell).Google Scholar
Hurley, Susan (1992). Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Google Scholar
Kirchin, Simon (2004). “Reasons and Reduction,” conference paper, The Space of Reasons, Cape Town (July).Google Scholar
Lear, Jonathan (1982). “Leaving the World Alone,” Journal of Philosophy, 79/7 (July), pp. 382–403.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lovibond, Sabina (1983). Realism and Imagination in Ethics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).Google Scholar
McDowell, John (1986). “Review of Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy,” Mind, 95/379, pp. 377–388.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McDowell, John (2001a). Mind, Value and Reality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).Google Scholar
McDowell, John (2001b). “Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?,” in McDowell (2001a), pp. 50–73.
Moore, Adrian (1985). “Transcendental Idealism in Wittgenstein, and Theories of Meaning,” Philosophical Quarterly, 35/139 (April), pp. 134–155.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moore, Adrian (1987). “Points of View,” Philosophical Quarterly, 37/146 (January), pp. 1–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moore, Adrian (1997). Points of View (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Google Scholar
Moore, Adrian (2003a). Noble in Reason, Infinite in Faculty (London: Routledge).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moore, Adrian (2003b). “Williams on Ethics, Knowledge and Reflection,” Philosophy, 78/305 (July), pp. 337–354.
Moore, Adrian (2005). “Maxims and Thick Ethical Concepts,” Proceedings and Addresses of the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association, 78/4 (February).Google Scholar
Moore, Adrian (2007). “Realism and the Absolute Conception,” this volume.
Putnam, Hilary (1992). “Bernard Williams and the Absolute Conception of the World,” in Realism with a Human Face (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), pp. 80–107.Google Scholar
Nozick, Robert, (2001). Invariances (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).Google Scholar
Nussbaum, Martha, (1995). “Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundations of Ethics,” in J. E. J. Altham and T. R. Harrison (1995), pp. 86–131.CrossRef
Quinn, Warren (1994). “Reflection and the Loss of Moral Knowledge,” in Morality and Action, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 134–148.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rorty, Richard (1989). Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shafer-Landau, Russ (1995). “Vagueness, Borderline Cases and Moral Realism,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 32 (1995), 83–96.Google Scholar
Thomas, Alan (2005). “Maxims and Thick Concepts: Reply to Moore,” Central Division of the American Philosophical Association. Available at: http://www.logical-operator.com/ReplytoMoore.pdf.Google Scholar
Thomas, Alan (2006). Value and Context: The Nature of Moral and Political Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Timmons, Mark (1999). Morality without Foundations (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Google Scholar
Wiggins, David (1991). “Moral Cognitivism, Moral Relativism and Motivating Moral Beliefs,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, pp. 61–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wiggins, David (2000). Needs, Values, Truth, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell).Google Scholar
Williams, Bernard (1981). “Wittgenstein and Idealism,” in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 144–163.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williams, Bernard (1986). “Reply to Blackburn,” Philosophical Books, 27/4 (October), pp. 203–208.Google Scholar
Williams, Bernard (1990). “The Need to Be Sceptical,” The Times Literary Supplement (February 16–22), pp. 163–164.Google Scholar
Williams, Bernard (1991). “Terrestrial Thoughts, Extraterrestrial Science: Review of Hilary Putnam, Realism with a Human Face,” London Review of Books (February 7), pp. 12–13.Google Scholar
Williams, Bernard (1995a). Making Sense of Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williams, Bernard (1995b). “Replies,” in Altham and Harrison, eds. (1995), pp. 185–224.
Williams, Bernard (1996). “Truth in Ethics,” in Hooker, Brad (1996), pp. 19–35.
Winch, Peter (1958). The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy, (London, Routledge).Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1975). On Certainty (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers).Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×