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1 - Introduction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 December 2009

Christopher S. Hill
Affiliation:
University of Arkansas
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Summary

Pilate said to him, “So you are a king?” Jesus answered, “You say that I am a king. For this I was born, and for this I have come into the world, to bear witness to the truth. Everyone who is of the truth hears my voice.” Pilate said to him, “What is truth?”

(John 19, 37–38)

When one has a belief, one is thereby related to a proposition. Thus, for example, if one believes that the universe is expanding, one stands in a certain psychological relation, the relation of believing, to the proposition that the universe is expanding. One is also related to this proposition if one fears that the universe is expanding or one hopes that the universe is expanding. In general, propositions are the objects to which we are related by the family of psychological relations that includes believing, fearing, hoping, desiring, intending, and considering.

We often claim that a proposition is true. Thus, we are all prepared to say that the proposition that snow is white is true. I will be concerned in this work to explain what we have in mind when we make such claims. That is to say, I will be concerned to analyze the concept of propositional truth. In addition, I will be concerned to adjudicate the various disputes about this concept that have traditionally divided philosophers.

To the extent that these efforts are successful, they will, I believe, illuminate the entire fabric of our thought and talk about truth.

Type
Chapter
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Thought and World
An Austere Portrayal of Truth, Reference, and Semantic Correspondence
, pp. 1 - 9
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2002

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  • Introduction
  • Christopher S. Hill, University of Arkansas
  • Book: Thought and World
  • Online publication: 07 December 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511615900.001
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  • Introduction
  • Christopher S. Hill, University of Arkansas
  • Book: Thought and World
  • Online publication: 07 December 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511615900.001
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Introduction
  • Christopher S. Hill, University of Arkansas
  • Book: Thought and World
  • Online publication: 07 December 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511615900.001
Available formats
×