In the Prologue, I mentioned five examples of non-paradigmatic or imperfect forgiveness in which one or more of the logical features defining forgiveness is absent. Because I am focusing on secular forgiveness, I am ignoring the problem of the forgiveness of God. The first three types – forgiving wrongs done to others (including victims no longer living), i.e., “third-party forgiveness,” forgiving the dead or unrepentant, and self-forgiveness – admit of myriad shades and textures, depending on the circumstances. The notion of imperfect instances of a virtue or moral quality raises a complex metaphysical question, which I will begin by sketching briefly, before turning to each of the three types of imperfect forgiveness. The puzzle centers on the idea of “degrees” of forgiveness.

IDEAL AND NON-IDEAL FORGIVENESS: AN INCLUSIVE OR EXCLUSIVE RELATION?

I have argued that forgiveness is a virtue especially important in an outlook that underlines our irremediable human imperfection. It both responds to an aspect of imperfection – wrongdoing and evil – and expresses our imperfection (our vulnerability, embodiment, finitude, and affective nature). I have set out a theory of paradigmatic forgiveness – of what forgiveness would have to be in order to be perfectly accomplished. It is a safe assumption that in the world as we have it, all of the conditions required by the paradigm case will not always obtain (though sometimes they will). Do the non-paradigmatic cases of forgiveness still count as instances of forgiveness, or does their logical deficiency defeat forgiveness?