An action is legitimate if the pertinent community deems it so. Most would agree that Russia's conduct in the 1990s in Georgia was illegitimate. Military intervention in another state, unless the other state is preparing an imminent attack on one's own territory, or is engaged in the systematic abuse of one's own citizens, is a violation of the international norm of sovereignty, at a minimum. Some have argued that European politics has gone beyond this ‘territorial integrity norm’ to something more expansive, to a consensual renunciation of any and all territorial claims on other states. This was first codified in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.

The interesting question is whether Russia deemed its behaviour illegitimate. If it knew that it was violating international sovereignty norms, that would say a lot about Russia's lack of regard for normative constraints on its foreign policy conduct. It would also speak to the relative weakness of international norms to shape state behaviour. On the other hand, and perhaps more interesting, if Russia did not believe its behaviour illegitimate, but instead thought its use of military force in another country was within the bounds of international propriety, then the question is how is it possible for Russia to entertain such ideas?

The answer in this article is that different Russian identities yield different understandings of legitimacy. There is no one Russia. Instead, depending on which discursive construction of the Russian self is empowered by Russia's political system at a given time, a different Russia is acting in the world.