Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-vfjqv Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-27T00:00:12.124Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

5 - Implantation and the beginning of the human individual

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 February 2010

Get access

Summary

It is now necessary to examine the stages of embryonic development after fertilization to see when the human individual begins. This will be done by way of exclusion by attempting to establish the last stage, or time, prior to which it would appear impossible, or at least implausible, for a human individual to be present in an ontological sense. In the following pages I shall first consider why it would seem that the individual human person could not be present during the early cleavage stage before the formation of the morula. In this section I will further discuss the implications of identical twinning for the beginning of the human individual, even though identical twinning can occur beyond this stage right up until implantation is almost completed. Arguments will then be presented that favour delaying hominization, or the formation of the human individual, beyond compaction and the morula stage. Next I will consider the relevance of naturally occurring short-lived parthenogenetic development that probably does occasionally occur in the human species. Finally, I shall examine evidence that suggests that the human individual could not actually exist before the formation of the blastocyst and its successful implantation in the womb about 13 days after fertilization.

The human individual not present during the early cleavage stage

Possibility of identical twinning during the early cleavage stage

It is important to bear in mind that the development of eutherian mammalian embryos differs quite significantly from that of amphibians. Of crucial importance for the former is the prior formation of extra-embryonic tissues and membranes (e.g. placenta), whereas the latter have no such need.

Type
Chapter
Information
When Did I Begin?
Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy and Science
, pp. 132 - 163
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1988

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×