Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-4hhp2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-06-05T10:01:19.903Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

5 - Negation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 March 2010

Get access

Summary

We shall now consider systems which extend PI by including a second connective, this time one that takes one argument. This connective is suggested by the ordinary word “not.” As in the case of ⊃, its properties in each system are precisely those given by the rules of the system; the degree to which it otherwise corresponds to the usage of “not” will not interest us in our systematic considerations. It is our intention, however, to introduce a series of systems with progressively greater specification of the connective (which we symbolize by ∼). As a first step, then, we wish to introduce the weakest plausible negation consistent with PI. Here we are helped by the relation between negation and what is sometimes referred to as “absurdity” (sometimes also as “inconsistency”). One of our strongest presystematic agreements concerning negation is that the result of simultaneously asserting a sentence A and its negation ∼ A is absurdity. In this connection, it is irrelevant as to which sentence we started from. There does appear to be a minority intuition, namely, that A and not-A is very different from B and not-B; this however appears to be correlated with a strong rejection of positive implication and we will not consider it at the present time.

Type
Chapter
Information
Systems of Logic , pp. 72 - 90
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1989

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

  • Negation
  • Norman M. Martin
  • Book: Systems of Logic
  • Online publication: 12 March 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625244.006
Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • Negation
  • Norman M. Martin
  • Book: Systems of Logic
  • Online publication: 12 March 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625244.006
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Negation
  • Norman M. Martin
  • Book: Systems of Logic
  • Online publication: 12 March 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625244.006
Available formats
×