Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Riots in Kosovo
- 2 Albanian Resentment Comes to a Boil
- 3 Armed Conflict Grows
- 4 Cease-Fire Breaks Down
- 5 Establishing the United Nations' First Colony
- 6 Living Under a Colonial Regime
- 7 Responding to the Wake-Up Call
- 8 The Politics of Purgatory
- 9 Enter Martti Ahtisaari
- 10 The Stage for Final Status
- 11 “Practical” Negotiations
- 12 Negotiations over Status Itself
- 13 The Ahtisaari Plan
- 14 The Plan Runs into Trouble
- 15 The Troika Takes Over
- 16 Independence Day
- 17 Kosovo's Future
- 18 Implications for the International Order
- Glossary of Acronyms
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
10 - The Stage for Final Status
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 January 2010
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Riots in Kosovo
- 2 Albanian Resentment Comes to a Boil
- 3 Armed Conflict Grows
- 4 Cease-Fire Breaks Down
- 5 Establishing the United Nations' First Colony
- 6 Living Under a Colonial Regime
- 7 Responding to the Wake-Up Call
- 8 The Politics of Purgatory
- 9 Enter Martti Ahtisaari
- 10 The Stage for Final Status
- 11 “Practical” Negotiations
- 12 Negotiations over Status Itself
- 13 The Ahtisaari Plan
- 14 The Plan Runs into Trouble
- 15 The Troika Takes Over
- 16 Independence Day
- 17 Kosovo's Future
- 18 Implications for the International Order
- Glossary of Acronyms
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
Summary
As Ahtisaari's appointment was being finalized in November 2005, the members of the Contact Group (France, Germany, Italy, Russian Federation, the UK, and the United States) issued ten “Guiding Principles for a settlement of the Status of Kosovo” to support Ahtisaari's efforts. These principles stated that any settlement should strengthen regional security and stability, ensure Kosovo's multiethnicity, provide for protection of the cultural and religious heritage in Kosovo, and enable Kosovo to cooperate effectively with international organizations and international financial institutions. They declared partition of Kosovo or its annexation to any other state unacceptable. The Contact Group position was popularly characterized as expressing “three no's”: no partitioning of Kosovo, no going back to the status before 1999, and no merging with other states.
In recruiting Ahtisaari for the special envoy position, the Quint had not yet officially committed itself to the goal of independence for Kosovo – and Russia, as the sixth member of the Contact Group, certainly had not. On the other hand, everyone including Ahtisaari agreed that there was no way that Kosovo could be folded back under Serbian control, and they also agreed that the status quo of international administration was not viable. Within the Contact Group, Britain and the United States were pushing hardest for some clear resolution of Kosovo's status and knew that independence would be the outcome.
Information
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Road to Independence for KosovoA Chronicle of the Ahtisaari Plan, pp. 119 - 140Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009
References
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