INTRODUCTION

Most people rely on their experiences to authorize their beliefs, including their religious and anti-religious beliefs. In fact, such reliance is so instinctive and pervasive that we are apt to take it for granted, and thereby likely to underestimate the degree to which existentially loaded and socially potent experiences inspire the fundamental beliefs and ways of thinking that orient our lives and guide our behavior. The question under discussion in this chapter is whether we can trust our RSE-based instincts. What reasons exist to accept or reject the beliefs to which the cognitive elements of RSEs give rise? In an era where many people are familiar with phenomena such as self-deception and brain washing, group-think and the manipulation of beliefs and behaviors by the mass media, the question of the cognitive reliability of RSEs is an especially pressing one. Unsurprisingly, many philosophers of religion in recent decades have attempted to evaluate the cognitive value of RSEs.

Previous chapters complicate the reliability question in precisely the right way. In particular, most of the short-circuited answers have already been rejected, leaving us with a less tractable but also more relevant puzzle. I begin here with a discussion of some possible answers to the question of the cognitive reliability of RSEs. I then take up what I think is the most promising line of analysis, namely, to regard some kinds of RSEs as types of perception.