Introduction

No philosopher has been more committed to the idea of the moral progress of humanity than Immanuel Kant. Yet, despite great technological progress, the twentieth century has witnessed numerous instances of organized violence, from wars spanning continents to the internal oppression and mass murder of citizens by the state. Because of its collective nature, moral gravity, and scope, no phenomenon challenges our hopes for moral progress more than the targeted slaughter of innocent civilians that we now refer to as “genocide.” Given that Kantian ethics directs us to the moral improvement of the species, it would appear that Kant's moral theory bears a heavy burden in terms of our ability to explain and respond to these extraordinary crimes. What can Kantian ethics tell us about the nature of genocide?

Kantian ethics demand respect for humanity as an end in itself. Genocide, insofar as it rejects the value of the humanity of some groups, would appear to be a principled rejection of that principle and so an attack on the very basis of Kantian ethics. Yet, a principled rejection of morality, Kant claims, is not possible for a human will. Evil for Kant is defined in terms of the universal principle of self-love, which critics maintain is too shallow and tame to express the depths of harm that characterize genocide. Does genocide therefore fall outside the parameters of Kantian ethical theory?