During the late 1950s, as Cold War tensions in Europe gathered fresh impetus in the form of confrontation over the status of Berlin, searching enquiries into the Eisenhower administration's national security policy were conducted in the public sphere of the academic writings of civilian defence intellectuals, as well as among informed commentators in the press and Congress. Some of this fresh impetus was attributable to the reception given to the Gaither Report and the concomitant Sputnik launch. The vision of burgeoning Soviet ICBM capabilities, and anxiety over the vulnerability of the continental United States and the SAC bomber force to a devastating attack, made many question the American stance over limited war. It no longer seemed credible, so the argument went, to threaten immediate escalation to large-scale use of nuclear weapons when faced with minor or local Soviet aggression, perhaps along the flanks of NATO, when the United States' own cities would be destroyed in the counter-blows that might then result. In this context, it was queried how much faith the NATO allies in Europe would continue to have in the US deterrent, leading to a loosening of the ties of the alliance and perhaps to a greater readiness to show accommodation to the Soviet Union.

One remedy proposed was to augment conventional capabilities in NATO, but the costs involved appeared prohibitive, and the Europeans themselves seemed very reluctant to devote a greater share of their resources to defence.