During the late war the Navy of Great Britain acquired a degree of consequence and superiority which it never before possessed, and is likely long to retain. This consequence arose in a great measure from the nature of the war, and the character of the enemy. In former wars it had been the policy of France to weaken England by attacking her remote possessions; vast armaments sailed from her ports to reduce our settlements in the East or West Indies, or assist our revolted colonies, and hostilities were carried to distant parts, and directed against comparatively insignificant objects. The capture of a sugar island in the West Indies, or the reduction of a fortress on the coast of Coromandel, were of little relative weight in the scale of national importance; and such were the objects against which the marine forces of France were chiefly directed. In few instances, however, were they successful; they experienced repeated defeats both in the East and West Indies; and, if we except the assistance they afforded to America, the combined fleets of the enemy produced no material impressions on the welfare of Great Britain.