The army deployment directive

On 23 December 1940 Halder held further discussions regarding the effectiveness of Soviet tanks. Intelligence on the subject was acknowledged to be sparse, but their relative inferiority, in comparison with German models, was identified in both armour and speed. The maximum thickness of Soviet armour was predicted to be 30mm, while the 4.5cm Ehrhard armament could penetrate German armour up to a range of only 800m. The Soviet panzer corps faced further disadvantages with very poor communication equipment and optical sights which were understood to be hazy and limited in range. In regard to the Wehrmacht, Halder noted that an additional 4,930 captured enemy tanks and ammunition carriers were being incorporated into German units.

That same morning Fromm reported to Halder that stocks of steel and non-ferrous metals were very low. As for food supplies Fromm remarked: ‘We'll muddle our way through 1941.’ The supply of rubber, vital to the production of tyres, was also proving ‘difficult’ and Fromm believed that new synthetics factories would be necessary. The next day General Paulus highlighted the extent of the rubber shortage, informing Halder that ten panzer divisions were operating at 10 per cent below strength purely as a result of tyre wear. This, together with vehicles undergoing maintenance or repair, resulted in a figure of 20 per cent of wheeled vehicles out of commission. This was a worryingly high figure considering the army was not engaged in anything other than occupation and training duties.