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1 - Raiders of the Lost Clause

Excavating the Buried Foundations of the Necessary and Proper Clause

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 May 2011

Gary Lawson
Affiliation:
Boston University School of Law
Geoffrey P. Miller
Affiliation:
New York University School of Law
Robert G. Natelson
Affiliation:
University of Montana School of Law
Guy I. Seidman
Affiliation:
University of Herzilya, Israel
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Summary

The U.S. Constitution creates a national government of limited and enumerated powers. More precisely, it creates a set of institutions of national governance of limited and enumerated powers. The Constitution never grants power to the “national government” or the “federal government” as an undifferentiated entity, but instead grants various aspects of governmental power to discrete actors. The president is vested with the “executive Power,” the federal courts are vested with the “judicial Power,” and Congress is vested with a range of specified “legislative Powers,” primarily though not exclusively identified in Article I, section 8 of the document, including the power to lay and collect taxes, borrow money, regulate various types of commerce, and provide for a military. The first seventeen clauses in Article I, section 8 identify (depending upon how one counts) roughly two dozen such legislative powers.

The eighteenth and last clause in Article I, section 8 grants Congress power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” Antifederalist critics of the Constitution pejoratively dubbed this provision “the Sweeping Clause,” arguing that it granted dangerously broad and ill-defined powers to the new national government.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

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References

Kaminski, John P., The Constitution Without a Bill of Rights, inThe Bill of Rights and the States: The Colonial and Revolutionary Origins of American Liberalism 16, 29 (Patrick T. Conley and John P. Kaminski eds., 1992)Google Scholar
Hamdan, Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1002, 1039–42 (2007)Google Scholar
Engdahl, David E., Intrinsic Limits of Congress' Power Regarding the Judicial Branch, 1999 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 75, 119–26Google Scholar
Natelson, Robert G., Judicial Review of Special Interest Spending: The General Welfare Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the Founders, 11 Tex. Rev. L. & Politics239 (2007)Google Scholar
Natelson, Robert G., The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 Buff. L. Rev. 1077 (2004)Google Scholar
Natelson, Robert G., The General Welfare Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay in Original Understanding, 52 U. Kansas L. Rev. 1 (2003)Google Scholar

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