Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contents by potentially anticompetitive business practices
- Contents by markets
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of contributors
- Preface
- Introduction: the transformation of competition policy in Europe
- A Anticompetitive behaviour by firms with market power
- B Agreements between firms
- C Mergers
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
Bibliography
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
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Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contents by potentially anticompetitive business practices
- Contents by markets
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of contributors
- Preface
- Introduction: the transformation of competition policy in Europe
- A Anticompetitive behaviour by firms with market power
- B Agreements between firms
- C Mergers
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
Summary
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- Chapter
- Information
- Cases in European Competition PolicyThe Economic Analysis, pp. 465 - 481Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009
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