Almost half a century ago, modern comparative politics was founded under the aegis of modernization theory. Although the scholars working in that tradition were a diverse lot in the opinions they spoused, they coincided in emphasizing the key role that economic and social development played in the evolution of political institutions. Political stability, the formation of liberal political attitudes and the emergence and consolidation of democratic regimes were all identified as the final destination in the process of political development. Their achievement was seen as part and parcel of the transition of all political societies from a pre-modern stage to full modernity.

It did not take long for comparativists, however, to dismiss the literature of political modernization altogether. The simple concept of political development could not encompass the multiplicity of ways in which underdeveloped societies were structured. It could not account either for the very distinctive regimes, democracy, fascism and communism, into which different developed nations organized by the end of the first third of the twentieth century. It was insufficient to explain the cyclical nature of violence and constitutional breakdowns that plagued many regions of the world. Finally, its theoretical implications were difficult to test. This was in part because it addressed longue-durée historical events. But it had mainly to do with the concept's lack of precise causal mechanisms. The cultural and political factors that generate institutional change and development remained ambiguous under modernization theory.