Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-25wd4 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-29T10:16:17.675Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

5 - Market power

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Giorgio Monti
Affiliation:
London School of Economics and Political Science
Get access

Summary

Four concepts of market power

At the heart of the EC's current economic approach to competition law is the view that market power offers a helpful preliminary filter to identify the sources of competition problems. However, the identification of market power is problematic because only firms in perfectly competitive markets are unable to raise price (because any price increase by one firm will lead to consumers switching to another competitor who sells at a lower price), but since perfect competition is a hypothetical model, it means all firms have some market power. This is why in the relatively competitive retail market for beer one brewer can comfortably advertise beer as ‘reassuringly expensive’ as a means of competing against others. Since the brief of a competition authority is not to create perfect competition but to deter certain forms of behaviour that harm economic welfare, only ‘significant’ manifestations of market power fall within the ambit of competition law. However, even with this qualification, the meaning of market power remains elusive.

There are four ways to think about market power. The first equates market power with the ability to increase price (the neoclassical approach), the second equates market power with commercial power, the third sees market power as the ability to exclude rivals so as to gain the power to increase price, and the fourth sees market power as a formal jurisdictional test.

Type
Chapter
Information
EC Competition Law , pp. 124 - 158
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2007

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

  • Market power
  • Giorgio Monti, London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Book: EC Competition Law
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511805523.006
Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • Market power
  • Giorgio Monti, London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Book: EC Competition Law
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511805523.006
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Market power
  • Giorgio Monti, London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Book: EC Competition Law
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511805523.006
Available formats
×