The pattern of the outcomes of conflict between rivals of great military inequality remained unchanged from antiquity until well into the twentieth century. Control over superior means of destruction almost always promised victory, continuous domination, or successful pacification. Weak protagonists – and insurgent populations – did not always accept this state of affairs, nor did they always assess correctly the balance of power or the might and determination of their powerful conquerors or rivals. Nevertheless, when the military superiority of oppressors was unquestionable, so were the results.

In this chapter, three issues are discussed. First, I note why, under conditions of acute military inferiority, weak protagonists chose an insurgency strategy in order to fight domination. Second, I explore how military superiority was traditionally employed in pacification, and I define strategic prototypes of counter-insurgency. Third, I expose the key variable that guaranteed that military superiority would be translated into effective domination or pacification.

Fighting Small Wars: Insurgents and Oppressors

Much of what is known about military aspects of armed struggle against foreign domination comes from the study of guerrilla warfare. Communities and nations choose to fight a guerrilla war against oppressors because it proves to be “frugal” and because it makes their own forces less vulnerable. Guerrilla warfare turns out to be the only form of violent resistance that has any chance of surviving repeated encounters with a militarily superior oppressor. Its advantages can perhaps be best understood by considering the burden associated with conventional warfare of pitched battles.