The East Riyadh operation was just the beginning. The May 2003 attack was followed by a seemingly endless series of shoot-outs and attacks, each of which raised concern about the security situation in the kingdom. For a long time, the view of many Western analysts was pessimistic. In the early summer of 2004, when the atmosphere was at its most tense, many believed that the situation was spinning completely out of control. Then, to the surprise of many, the violence subsided. By late 2006 the QAP campaign had petered out. Why?

The aims of the QAP

Before looking at the campaign in more detail, it is worth reflecting briefly on what the QAP was fighting for. A key question which has divided analysts is whether the militants were aiming to topple the Saudi government or merely to evict the Western presence. In other words, was the QAP a revolutionary or pan-Islamist phenomenon? The conventional way of looking at terrorist groups' intentions consists of establishing a list of aims derived from the groups' declarations. However, the ‘manifesto approach’ can be misleading, because groups often mix short-, mid- and long-term aims in their statements, depending on context. Group leaders may also describe their objectives differently, according to whether they are speaking to other leaders, to their footsoldiers or to a wider audience. As we shall see, this was indeed the case with the QAP, and we therefore need a slightly more nuanced approach.