The previous two chapters have focussed upon the interpretation of the just cause condition of the JAB. In this chapter, we shall examine those conditions of the JAB that are more concerned with the exercise of prudence in approaching the decision to wage war. This raises issues having to do with the consideration of expectations and consequences and the judgement and balancing of the weight and relevance of such matters. Emphasis on the broadly non-consequentialist nature of the just war tradition can give rise to the thought that this form of thinking cannot be concerned at all with consequences. This is a foolish thought, though it can be encouraged by some of the starker oppositions that philosophers sometimes make between consequentialist theories and those that are contrasted with them. No moral theory and no moral thinking can afford to ignore entirely the assessment of the consequences of action. Where intrinsicalist theories part company from theories like utilitarianism is in their refusal to treat the assessment of consequences as the whole task of moral thinking.