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4 - Acting rationally

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

R. M. Sainsbury
Affiliation:
University of Texas, Austin
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Summary

Newcomb's paradox

You are confronted with a choice. There are two boxes before you, A and B. You may either open both boxes, or else just open B. You may keep what is inside any box you open, but you may not keep what is inside any box you do not open. The background is this.

A very powerful being, who has been invariably accurate in his predictions about your behavior in the past, has already acted in the following way:

He has put $1,000 in box A.

If he has predicted that you will open just box B, he has in addition put $1,000,000 in box B.

If he has predicted that you will open both boxes, he has put nothing in box B.

The paradox consists in the fact that there appears to be a decisive argument for the view that the most rational thing to do is to open both boxes; and also a decisive argument for the view that the most rational thing to do is to open just box B. The arguments commend incompatible courses of action: if you take both boxes, you cannot also take just box B. Putting the arguments together entails the overall conclusion that taking both boxes is the most rational thing and also not the most rational thing. This is unacceptable, yet the arguments from which it derives are apparently acceptable.

Type
Chapter
Information
Paradoxes , pp. 69 - 89
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2009

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  • Acting rationally
  • R. M. Sainsbury, University of Texas, Austin
  • Book: Paradoxes
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511812576.006
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  • Acting rationally
  • R. M. Sainsbury, University of Texas, Austin
  • Book: Paradoxes
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511812576.006
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Acting rationally
  • R. M. Sainsbury, University of Texas, Austin
  • Book: Paradoxes
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511812576.006
Available formats
×