We have been distinguishing among leopards, ‘leopards,’ and leopards, and among Eisenhower, ‘Eisenhower,’ and Eisenhower; among, that is, the word, the concept, and the thing. We need to make one further clarification concerning the concept. We will now clarify how ‘leopard’ and ‘Eisenhower’ become part of our philosophical vocabulary as signifying concepts as distinguished from things and names.

The Concept Is an Intelligibility Taken as Present to Someone

We have discussed the interaction between the name and the thing, between leopard and leopard. The name targets not just the thing but also its intelligibility. The name does not just call the thing to mind; the name is not just a signal; the name, like a key, unlocks the thing to capture its intelligibility and to enlist the thing and its understandability into syntax. The name presents the thing in its intelligibility.

This intelligibility is disclosed both to the user of the name and to the dative of the name, to the speaker and to the listener (the potential respondent, who can also use the word). Normally, the listener is simply guided by the words of the speaker to focus on the thing in its intelligibility. It is better, incidentally, to say “the thing in its intelligibility” than “the thing and its intelligibility,” because the latter suggests that the intelligibility and the thing are two different “entities,” whereas the former makes it clear that the thing subsists only by being intelligible.