A rising tide lifts all boats. Even though international institutions recently have shunned the “T” word (transition) when discussing Russia and non–European Union members of the former Soviet bloc, they have preserved hope by lowering their horizons. Where it once was claimed that post-Soviet workers would cast off their chains, ridding themselves of the authoritarian martial police state, equitably privatizing collective assets, and becoming democratic free enterprisers, many western analysts prefer to forget these unfulfilled promises, concentrating instead on securing sustained economic growth now that Russia has, or soon will recover, the previously achieved Soviet level. By averting their eyes, an unwieldy problem of cultural transformation has been reduced to seemingly manageable dimensions. The approach isn't novel and could succeed in a limited fashion. As shown in Chapter 5, the advantages of relative backwardness enabled the Kremlin to grow modestly during the tsarist and Soviet periods, and it could happen again with or without liberalization. Any complete appraisal of Russia's future therefore has two aspects: the sustainability and merit of Russian GDP growth beyond the peak Soviet level.

Technocrats have little difficulty making a case for sustainable growth, without coming to grips with the deeper problem of inferior Muscovite competitiveness. They argue cogently that growth depends on improvements attainable from technological borrowing and advances in knowledge, other things being equal.