The World Trade Organization's (WTO's) dispute settlement system represents an unprecedented grant of legal authority to international tribunals to enforce international legal norms, backed by the threat of economic sanctions. The United States was not only the principle demandeur of this system but also has been the most active participant. At first glance, the U.S. approach to dispute settlement in the trade area appears to contrast sharply with its approach to legalized dispute settlement in many other areas of international relations. Indeed, the United States' leading role in this area seems even more remarkable in light of the country's history of economic protectionism.

However, a closer look at the history of U.S. approaches to the resolution of trade disputes suggests that a more nuanced appraisal is in order. This history reveals that although the United States has generally supported rule-based approaches to settling trade disputes, at times it has evidenced ambivalence about the normative desirability and practical utility of a legalized dispute settlement process in the trade area. It also suggests that U.S. government support for judicialized dispute settlement in international trade is based less on an abstract commitment to the rule of law in international relations than on pragmatic, short-term, and highly contextual calculations that this mechanism serves U.S. interests better than alternative arrangements. Finally, this history suggests that the level of U.S. commitment to, and participation in, legalized trade dispute resolution mechanisms reflects a two-level game in which U.S. officials mediate conflicting pressures generated by their foreign counterparts and domestic political actors.