Introduction

The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia was the UN's first attempt at engaging in multidimensional peacekeeping since the downfall of the Congo operation in 1964. Ending in March 1990, the mission differed from all previous UN peacekeeping operations in that its primary means and purpose were political (in overseeing a democratic transition after decades of civil war and colonial rule), rather than military (where monitoring a cease-fire is the primary task). The mission also brought about the innovation of several important peacekeeping mechanisms that are still in use today, namely, a western “Contact Group,” an elaborate “information program,” and most significantly, UN “civilian policing” in its current form. Overall, the operation was successful on two fronts: first, in terms of implementing the Security Council Resolution 435 mandate; and second, by creating the conditions for the ongoing political stability of post-independence Namibia.

In this chapter, I argue that UNTAG was able to “learn” as an organization on the ground, during mandate implementation, and that this was a primary cause of the operation's successful conclusion. While fortuitous “situational factors” and moderate Security Council interests were also important conditions, organizational learning lies at the heart of UNTAG's success. At critical moments during the implementation of the peace accords, UNTAG took its cues from local, rather than higher-level political forces in the Security Council. In other words, the implementation was not micromanaged from the political center in New York.