Why, exactly, should inequalities that are due to luck be thought to be less defensible than ones that are not? This is the central question that luck egalitarianism raises, and it has both an analytical and a normative dimension. The question is partly analytical because we cannot answer it without offering a more precise specification of the feature that separates the two classes of inequalities, but it is partly normative because it also requires an explanation of that feature's moral importance. In this chapter and the next, I will discuss the three most plausible sets of answers to the central question. Because each set invokes the relevant normative consideration only to justify those inequalities that display the cited feature, but not to make the case for equality in its absence, each justification of luck egalitarianism that emerges will be pluralistic. By coming to understand why each such justification fails, we will begin the monistic turn that will ultimately propel us beyond luck egalitarianism.

I

At first glance, the task of giving content to the luck egalitarian's central distinction may not seem particularly difficult; for when luck egalitarians summarize their position, they tend to do so in strikingly similar terms. To characterize the inequalities that they are willing to accept – the ones that are not matters of luck – they standardly describe them as inequalities for which the parties are responsible. Along these lines, we often encounter assertions such as the following: