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6 - Reforming Homeland Security and Intelligence after 9/11

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Jordan Tama
Affiliation:
American University, Washington DC
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Summary

On January 31, 2001 – eleven days after the presidential inauguration of George W. Bush – the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (the Hart-Rudman Commission) issued a dire warning and a related recommendation on the first page of its final report's executive summary:

The combination of unconventional weapons proliferation with the persistence of international terrorism will end the relative invulnerability of the U.S. homeland to catastrophic attack. A direct attack against American citizens on American soil is likely over the next quarter century. The risk is not only death and destruction but also a demoralization that could undermine U.S. global leadership. In the face of this threat, our nation has no coherent or integrated governmental structures.

We therefore recommend the creation of an independent National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security.

(U.S. Commission on National Security 2001, xiii)

The commission's report, produced by a star-studded group led by former Senators Gary Hart (D-CO) and Warren Rudman (R-NH), was the culmination of the most comprehensive review of U.S. national security in more than fifty years (Zegart 2007, 5). Yet the commission's doomsday forecast was barely noticed by the national media – the New York Times did not publish a single article on the report – and received little attention in Washington. President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney declined to be briefed on it.

Type
Chapter
Information
Terrorism and National Security Reform
How Commissions Can Drive Change During Crises
, pp. 138 - 178
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2011

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