The Argument from Causation

One of the standard arguments against philosophical behaviourism is the argument from causation. According to behaviourism, describing someone's state of mind is describing how that person is disposed to behave. But, according to this standard argument, in describing someone's state of mind you are really describing what makes that person disposed to act in the way he or she does, not simply that that person is disposed to act that way. So, by this argument, behaviourism misrepresents the causal role of the mind.

According to behaviourism the relation represented by the bottom left arrow in Figure 4.1 is that of identity – mental states just are dispositions to behave. Behaviourists differ as to how to construe the relation represented by the bottom right arrow. But I shall argue that it is one of causation.

The argument from causation has two separate versions corresponding to these two arrows. In one version it is claimed that the left-hand arrow should represent the relation of causation, whereas behaviourism takes it to represent identity. It is claimed that states of mind themselves causally explain dispositions to behave and so cannot themselves simply be dispositions to behave.

The other version claims that the right-hand arrow should not represent the relation of causation. It is argued that whereas a state of mind can cause behaviour, a disposition to behave cannot; it is not properly separate from the behaviour, as a cause should be from its effect.