Disagreeing with Rawls's position in The Law of Peoples, some cosmopolitans argue that Rawlsian domestic theory of justice should be extended to the global domain. Rawlsian cosmopolitans emphasise that there exists a global basic structure relevantly similar to the domestic ones, and that the same reasons Rawls argues call for the application of distributive justice in the domestic case require the global application of principles of justice. I start this chapter by describing this cosmopolitan argument. Next, I outline some arguments critics make against the applicability of Rawlsian principles of justice in the global domain. These objections to global distributive justice are based on reasons internal to Rawls's domestic theory of justice, in contrast with Rawls' objections in The Law of Peoples. I defend the cosmopolitan interpretation of Rawlsian theory by showing that the objections do not warrant limiting the scope of justice to the domestic level because Rawls's rationale for the application of the principles of justice holds for the global domain. Finally, I evaluate the claim that Rawlsian theory would require the international redistribution of natural resources even in the absence of global cooperation.