As we saw in Chapter 1, Hume endorses the importance of a ‘spirit of scepticism’ in politics when he criticises Hobbes as a rationalistic dogmatist. In a letter to Montesquieu Hume also asserts that he ‘kept on the sceptical and doubtful side’ of the debate over the populations in the ancient and modern worlds (L I, 177; see also Box and Silverthorne 2013). Although he finally claims in the essay ‘Of Populousness’ that the population of the modern world was greater than that of the ancient, Hume's stance on the querelle des anciens et des modernes is more nuanced than is immediately apparent from the conclusion in this essay. Examples of such scepticism abound in his political writings, many of which are related to his view of civilisation. As Forbes appropriately points out, ‘[t]hat political civilization is a precarious thing is Hume's most general and most useful and lasting lesson of moderation’ (1975b: 309). From this perspective, it should be reconsidered how Hume's view of civilisation is an indispensable and probably the most important aspect of his Sceptical Enlightenment.

Throughout his writings, Hume maintains a coherent conviction regarding the vicissitudes of a nation: that any country will experience a period of cultural progress followed by decline. In other words, he adopts a cyclical or pendulum view of history. In spite of the assumptions the term ‘cyclical’ or ‘pendulum’ often evokes, however, Hume's emphasis is placed not upon the claim that human history in any field inevitably follows a particularly determined pattern. On the contrary, as he repeatedly asserts, ‘human society is in perpetual flux’ (E ‘Original Contract’ 476), or ‘[n]othing in this world is perpetual; Every thing, however seemingly firm, is in continual flux and change’ (‘Immortality of the Soul’ 597). For Hume, a blind belief in any sort of pre-determined cycle within our history differs not at all from the faith in perpetual progress that he criticises. Nevertheless, Hume retains a faint underlying image of ‘the rise, progress, perfection, and decline’ (H II, 519), especially in the fields of the arts and sciences, without prescribing any particular route for this process in either case.