Was Richard M. Nixon mad when he acquired responsibility for US foreign policy? The attention paid to his personality suggests that many people believed him to be so, or close to it. In one context Nixon evidently preferred it that way: Although he possessed no secret plan to fulfill his campaign promise to end the war in Vietnam, he intended to persuade North Vietnam and its allies that Hanoi must either agree to a quick peace or face the consequences of a madman with the power to unleash America's nuclear arsenal. “They'll believe any threat of force Nixon makes because it's Nixon,” the president confided to his chief of staff, H. R. “Bob” Haldeman. “I want the North Vietnamese to believe I've reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war. We'll just slip the word to them [that we] can't restrain him when he's angry… and Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace.”

Whether Nixon sincerely sought to portray himself as a madman, was mad to think he could, or was just plain mad is difficult to determine, although many have tried. Recollections of conversations often are mistaken. This one, however, is true. Still, even if it was not, the question invites us to consider the complex relationship between psychological approaches and the history of American foreign relations. Personality studies long dominated the field, but new developments in social and cognitive psychology have opened up additional avenues for inquiry and interpretation. It is these new directions, along with more traditional approaches, that reinforce the notion that people, as individuals and as members of policy-relevant groups, can and do influence the course of foreign affairs. Nixon, it turns out, is not alone.

HISTORY'S SLOW EMBRACE OF PSYCHOLOGY

Historians were long skeptical about the utility of applying psychology in an effort to understand American foreign relations. In part this skepticism evolved from the levels-of-analysis question: Are the sources of state conduct to be found at the level of the external environment, domestic circumstances, or the individual policymaker? Diplomatic history, reflecting realist roots that extend back to Thucydides, traditionally favored the systemic (external environment) level. Diplomatic historians, accordingly, portrayed policymakers as rational actors with fixed human natures seeking to advance the national interest through cost–benefit analyses. Because psychology introduces elements beyond situational rationality, it appeared inappropriate – and discomforting.