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1 - The Troubled Congress

Steven S. Smith
Affiliation:
Washington University, St Louis
Jason M. Roberts
Affiliation:
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Ryan J. Vander Wielen
Affiliation:
Temple University, Philadelphia
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Summary

For most Americans today, Congress is our most frustrating political institution. Legislation is the product of a process marked by controversy, frequent delay, partisanship, and bargaining. Even some members of Congress are uncomfortable with the sharp rhetoric and wheeling and dealing that are hallmarks of legislative politics. They are among the most severe critics of the institution.

Nevertheless, Congress is important to understand. No other national legislature has greater power than the Congress of the United States. Its daily actions affect the lives of all Americans and many people around the world. It checks the exercise of power by the president, the courts, and the bureaucracy. If you want to understand the forces influencing your well being, you must understand Congress.

Congress is not easy to understand. Its sheer size – 535 members and more than 25,000 employees – is bewildering. Its system of parties, leaders, committees, and procedures, built up over 200 years, is remarkably complex and serves as an obstacle to public understanding.

Congress is always changing. It changes because it is a remarkably permeable institution. New problems, whatever their source, invariably create new demands on Congress. Elections bring new members who often alter the balance of opinion in the House and Senate. Elections also frequently bring a change in majority party control of Congress, which leads to a transfer of agenda control on the floor and in committees from one party to another. In addition, each new president asks for support for his policy program. Members of Congress often respond to these demands by passing new legislation. However, as lawmakers pursue their personal political goals, compete with one another for control over policy, and react to pressure from presidents, their constituents, and lobbyists, they sometimes seek to gain advantage or to remove impediments to action by altering the procedures and organization of Congress itself. The result is nearly continuous change within the institution.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2013

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References

Boller, Paul, Congressional Anecdotes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 18Google Scholar
Ornstein, Norman J., “Congress Inside Out: Here’s Why Life on the Hill Is Meaner Than Ever,” Roll Call, September 20, 1993
Dahl, Robert A., “Americans Struggle to Cope with a New Political Order that Works in Opaque and Mysterious Ways,” Public Affairs Report (Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, Berkeley, September 1993), 1, 4–6Google Scholar
Salisbury, Robert H., “The Paradox of Interest Groups in Washington – More Groups, Less Clout,” in The New American Political System, 2nd ed., ed. King, Anthony, 203–229 (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sinclair, Barbara, The Transformation of the U.S. Senate (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 57–64Google Scholar
Lowi, Theodore J., “Toward a Legislature of the First Kind,” in Knowledge, Power, and the Congress, eds. Robinson, William H. and Wellborn, Clay H. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1991), 9–36Google Scholar
Dodd, Lawrence C., “Congress and the Politics of Renewal: Redressing the Crisis of Legitimation,” in Congress Reconsidered, 5th ed., ed. Dodd, Lawrence C. and Oppenheimer, Bruce I. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993), 426Google Scholar
Fenno, Jr. Richard F., Learning to Govern: An Institutional View of the 104th Congress (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1997)Google Scholar
“Capitol Hill’s Uncertainty Principle,” National Journal, November 2, 1996

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