When the German army invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, its generals expected to fight a Blitzkrieg – a war of quick movement, overwhelming force, and short duration – in which they could take advantage of their superior leadership and well-trained and disciplined soldiers. Given the limitations of German human and material resources, it was the only kind of war that had any hope of success. It was also to be like no other war: Hitler did not issue an ultimatum, and he did not envisage a possible peace treaty with Stalin. This war was to be a war of annihilation. It was to be the kind of war that the Nazis had prepared for from the moment of their conquest of power. Anything that happened before the invasion of the Soviet Union was merely preparation. Already in June 1941 the outlines of future German behavior were present, and so were therefore the sources of their ultimate failure and defeat.

In view of what happened later, it is remarkable to read the writings of Nazi leaders written soon after the invasion began. Experienced military officers expected the collapse of the Red Army in two weeks, and Nazi leaders were already making plans to level Moscow and Leningrad and incorporate into the Reich enormous territories in which Slavic slaves would work to create a paradise for “Germanic peoples.” Generals seriously thought they would be able to use their divisions that in June were engaged in the East against British possessions around the world by the autumn. They had little respect for the Red Army and were so convinced of their quick success that they saw little need to gain the support of the population. Past easy victories misled them. The expectation of a quick victory was one more demonstration of the inability of the Nazis to look at the world as it really was. Germany was ultimately defeated because its leaders lived in a world that they only imagined. Except for its moral depravity, the most striking feature of Nazism was its utter irrationality.