Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Preface
- Abbreviations
- 1 Portals of Democracy in American Bureaucracy
- 2 Participatory Bureaucracy in Practice
- 3 The Development of Public Committees
- 4 Making Educational Performance Public
- 5 Private Knowledge for Public Problems
- 6 Setting the Public Agenda
- 7 Deliberate Participation
- 8 The Impact of Public Advice
- 9 Participatory Bureaucracy in American Democracy
- Appendix
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
2 - Participatory Bureaucracy in Practice
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 October 2014
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Preface
- Abbreviations
- 1 Portals of Democracy in American Bureaucracy
- 2 Participatory Bureaucracy in Practice
- 3 The Development of Public Committees
- 4 Making Educational Performance Public
- 5 Private Knowledge for Public Problems
- 6 Setting the Public Agenda
- 7 Deliberate Participation
- 8 The Impact of Public Advice
- 9 Participatory Bureaucracy in American Democracy
- Appendix
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
Summary
Bureaucratic administration means fundamentally the exercise of control on the basis of knowledge ... technical knowledge ... [and] official secrets.
– Max WeberNothing has been discovered which acts in entire isolation.
– John DeweyParticipatory bureaucracy is a systematic process of public engagement that brings diverse expertise to bear on task implementations. When participation is bureaucratic, it is consistent with the core elements of bureaucratic reputation: unique agency expertise and diverse support. When bureaucracy is participatory, the scope of participation is fluid. It enables information to flow in multiple directions – to the agency, from the agency, and beyond the individuals who participate in a particular decision.
Yet, when is participatory bureaucracy likely to arise and add value to bureaucratic administration and democratic accountability? When are we more likely to see participatory oversight that is imposed on bureaucratic administration and that potentially perpetuates the bureaucracy-democracy trade-off, where participation comes at the expense of bureaucratic administration and reputation? The answer resides, in part, in the conditions of the policy task and the design of participation. Scholars have long examined bureaucrats’ intentional and active engagement with publics outside agency walls to build supportive coalitions, to gather information, and to facilitate policy implementation. Agencies also intentionally reveal their information to exert regulatory authority, to persuade, to educate other implementers, and to build consensus. Francis Rourke astutely observed more than a half century ago: “Many ... agencies spend a great deal more time in publicizing themselves than they do in concealing information ... their path to power is publicity rather than secrecy.” Participatory bureaucracy builds on these insights but embodies a key distinction: it has the potential to manage the tension between bureaucratic administration and democratic accountability. In other words, for participation to be bureaucratic, it must support competent public administration. For bureaucracy to be participatory, it must support aspects of democratic accountability. Not all public engagement supports bureaucratic administration. Not all public engagement supports democratic accountability. Participatory bureaucracy represents a subset of public engagement in which both bureaucracy and democracy have the potential to be better off.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Making Policy PublicParticipatory Bureaucracy in American Democracy, pp. 28 - 54Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2014
References
, The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations (London: Free Press of Glencoe, Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1947), p. 339Google Scholar
, The Public and Its Problems (Athens: Swallow Press/Ohio University Press, 1927), p. 22Google Scholar
Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1976), pp. 65–66Google Scholar
, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001)Google Scholar
, Organizations in Action: Social Sciences Bases of Administrative Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), p. 33Google Scholar
, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Basic Books, 1989), pp. 188–192Google Scholar
, Acceptable Risks: Politics, Policy and Risky Technologies (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997) p. 19Google Scholar
, “Groups, The Media, Agency Waiting Costs and FDA Drug Approval,” American Journal of Political Science 46 (2002): 490–505CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, “FEMA and the Prospects for Reputation-Based Autonomy,” Studies in American Political Development 20 (2006): 57–87CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and , “Explaining Bureaucratic Optimism: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Executive Agency Macroeconomic Forecasts,” American Political Science Review 101 (2007): 129–142CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and , Working, Shirking and Sabotage: Bureaucratic Response to a Democratic Public (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, What Motivates Bureaucrats? Politics and Administration During the Reagan Years (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, The Administrative Behavior of Federal Bureau Chiefs (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 24–78Google Scholar
and , Politics and the Bureaucracy: Policymaking in the Fourth Branch of Government (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2007), pp. 53–63Google Scholar
, Secrecy and Publicity: Dilemmas of Democracy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1961), p. 127Google Scholar
and , “Using Knowledge for Control in Fragmented Policy Arenas,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 3 (1984): 225–247CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and , “Behavioral Assumptions of Policy Tools,” Journal of Politics 52 (1990): 510–529CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, Essays in Sociology, edited and translated by and (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946)Google Scholar
, “Essays on Bureaucracy,” in Bureaucratic Power in National Politics edited by (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), p. 12Google Scholar
, Democracy in the Administrative State (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 60Google Scholar
, “Lessons from Welfare,” American Political Science Review 93 (1999): 363–380CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and , Deliberate Discretion: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 13CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and , “Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Control,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3 (1987): 243–277Google Scholar
, , and , “Structure and Process, Policy and Politics: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies,” Virginia Law Review 75(1989): 431–482CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, Pragmatist Democracy: Evolutionary Learning as Public Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 4CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and , “Interest Groups, Advisory Committees, and Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy,” American Journal of Political Science 45 (2001): 799–812CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, “Federal Advisory Committees, Interest Groups and the Administrative State,” Congress & The Presidency 13 (1986): 83–114CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, Administrative Regulation – A Study in Representation of Interests (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), pp. 160–188Google Scholar
, “Political Control versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures,” American Political Science Review 89 (1995): 62–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and , Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 80–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, “Setting the Agenda in the U.S. Senate: A Theory of Problem Selection,” British Journal of Political Science 7 (1977): 423–445CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 140Google Scholar
, “Interests, Institutions and Positive Theory: the Politics of the NLRB,” Studies in American Political Development 2 (1987): 236–299CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, “The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy,” in Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond, edited by (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 116–153Google Scholar
, “Blue Ribbons, Black Boxes: Toward a Better Understanding of Presidential Commissions,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 34 (2004): 366–393CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989)Google Scholar
and , “Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform,” American Political Science Review 98 (2004): 481–494CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, Empowered Participation: Reinventing Urban Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004)Google Scholar
, “Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance,” Public Administration Review 66 (2006): 66–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, Chain Reaction: Expert Debate and Public Participation in American Commercial Nuclear Power, 1945–1975 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America (New York: Thompson Learning, 1960)Google Scholar
, Government and Science: Their Dynamic Relation in American Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 153Google Scholar
, “Closure and Capture in Federal Advisory Committees,” Business and Politics 4 (2002): 213–238CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and , “A Bias Toward Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the Bureaucracy,” Journal of Politics 68 (2006): 128–139CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, “The Participation-Centered Model Meets Administrative Practice,” Wisconsin Law Review 2 (2013): 671–692Google Scholar
, The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, “Uncertainty, Difficulty and Complexity,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 20 (2008): 115–149CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, “Lineages of the Rube Goldberg State: Building and Blurring Public Programs, 1900–1940,” in The Art of the State: Rethinking Political Institutions, edited by , , and (New York: New York University Press, 2006), pp. 187–215Google Scholar
, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and , “Governing the Hollow State,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 10 (2000): 359–380CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and , Bureaucracy in a Democratic State: A Governance Perspective (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), pp. 48, 58, 122–123Google Scholar
and , Learning While Governing: Expertise and Accountability in the Executive Branch (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012)Google Scholar
, The School and Society and the Child and the Curriculum, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 30Google Scholar
and , The Ordeal of Equality: Did Federal Regulation Fix the Schools? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), pp. 17–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, “Promoting Agency Reputation through Public Advice: Advisory Committee Use in the FDA,”Journal of Politics 72 (2010): 880–893CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and , “The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework,” Administration & Society 6 (1975): 478–480Google Scholar
and , Agendas and Instability in American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 11Google Scholar
, “The Politics of Blame Avoidance,” Journal of Public Policy 6 (1986): 371–398CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and , “Reputation and Public Administration,” Public Administration Review 72 (2012): 26–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and , “Organizational Reputation, Regulatory Talk, and Strategic Silence,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 23 (2013): 581–608CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, “Organizational Reputation and Jurisdictional Claims: The Case of the US Food and Drug Administration,” Governance 23 (2010): 133–159CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisors as Policy Makers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990)Google Scholar
, Science on Stage: Expert Advice as Public Drama (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000)Google Scholar
, “Public Information,” in The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance, edited by (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002)Google Scholar
and , “Public Information Campaigns as Policy Instruments,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 13 (1994): 82–119CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, Organizations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992)Google Scholar
, “Food and Drug Administration,” in The Politics of Regulation, (ed.) (New York: Basic Books, 1980), pp. 205–206Google Scholar
and , “Wicked Problems, Knowledge Challenges, and Collaborative Capacity Builders in Network Settings,” Public Administration Review 68 (2008): 334–349CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and , The Diversity Paradox: Political Parties, Legislatures, and the Organizational Foundations of Representation in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012)Google Scholar
, Beyond Adversary Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 244–246
, , , and , “The Complications of Controlling Agency Time Discretion: FDA Review Deadlines and Postmarket Safety,” American Journal of Political Science 56 (2012): 98–114CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and , “In Setting Doctors’ Medicare Fees, CMS Almost Always Accepts The Relative Value Update Panel’s Advice On Work Values,” Health Affairs, 31 (2012): 965–972CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
, “Fairly Balanced: The Politics of Representation on Government Advisory Committees,” Political Research Quarterly 61 (2008): 547–560CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949)Google Scholar
and , The External Control of Organizations (New York: Harper and Row, 2003), pp. 110, 164Google Scholar
, , and , “Risk of Cardiovascular Events Associated With Selective COX-2 Inhibitors,” JAMA 286 (2001): 954–959CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
et al., “Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis,” New England Journal of Medicine 343 (2000): 1520–1528CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
, The SEC and Capital Market Regulation: The Politics of Expertise (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992)Google Scholar
Jr., The Politics of Public Utility Regulation (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983)Google Scholar
, The Political Economy of Expertise (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar