The previous chapter argued that political cohesion, room for trial-and-error policy experimentation, and effective reframing of the problem were important factors in overcoming logistical and acceptability constraints, ultimately helping pro-conditional reform efforts to succeed. Unfortunately, neither logistical nor acceptability constraints disappear once conditional repression is implemented, even when it proves effective at reducing violence. Indeed, conditional approaches appear to generate self-undermining dynamics that can lead to their erosion over time. For one thing, they can be—ironically—victims of their own success: precisely because conditionality produces sharp decreases in violence, conditional pilot programs can come to be seen as silver bullets, and hence are hastily replicated and deployed to problem areas. Three problems arise: first, the replicated versions of the original program may be imperfect copies, lacking key elements such as proper training, committed leadership, or buy-in and participation from civil society. Second, whereas pilot programs are generally developed in smaller, relatively controlled environments, repli- cations can frequently get deployed in crisis areas whose characteristics make them far more challenging. Finally, conditional repression is generally more resource-intensive than unconditional repression, and expanding conditional programs from pilot areas to crisis areas further raises this cost differential.