Introduction

The previous chapters focused on the “objective” exogenous and endogenous pressures to which politicians and governments must react so as to adapt, update, retrench, or restructure the welfare state. No matter how strong the demands for reform are and how existentially threatening the challenges might be, there is no guarantee that political actors will do the job of reform. And we stress once more that whether reforms should be implemented or consciously abstained from (in the latter case effecting policy drift) and which reforms are considered “necessary” are ultimately political decisions made in the arena of democratic politics. This chapter highlights what is special about the context of democratic politics, and especially the political logic of elections, for the political opportunities and constraints of different types of welfare state reform. Given that the welfare state is politically well entrenched and very popular among citizens and assuming that political parties wish to win elections, why would politicians and governments pursue reforms that may cost votes? So, the big questions of this chapter are why, how, and when do politicians and governments translate the exogenous and endogenous pressures into reform if the new policies that are needed contradict their electoral ambitions?